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Senate

The Senate met at 11:45 a.m. and was called to order by the President pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND).

PRAYER

The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, Sovereign of this Nation and personal Lord of our lives, we praise You for our accountability to You. You are a God of judgment as well as grace. If you did not care, life would have no meaning. We thank You for giving us the basis on which we will be judged each hour and at the end of each day. You want us to know what is required of us so we can pass Your daily examination with flying colors.

Your Commandments are in force as much now as when You gave them to Moses. You require us to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with You. You call for integrity, honesty, and faithfulness. Absolute trust in You is the secret for personal peace and the basis for leading a Nation. Help us to live our Nation's motto, "In God We Trust," and judge us by the extent we have put our trust in You for guidance.

Gracious God, as we receive Your judgment, we also seek Your forgiveness and a new beginning. May Your forgiveness give us the courage to seek first Your rule and righteousness.

Today we thank You for Eileen R. Connor, the Supervisor of Expert Transcribers from the Office of Official Reporters of Debates. Tomorrow will be the last day for Eileen after 25 years of dedicated service to the Senate. In Your Holy Name. Amen.

RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The able acting majority leader, Senator SMITH of New Hampshire, is recognized.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Chair.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Could I ask my colleague for 2 seconds?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield to the Senator.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR—VOTE ON EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2314

Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent that Scott Muschett, an intern in my office, be allowed to be on the floor during this vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUTCHINSON). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

SCHEDULE

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I announce this morning the Senate will resume consideration of the Senator Smith of New Hampshire and the Senator Hutchison of Texas amendment No. 2314, pending to the NATO enlargement treaty. Under the previous order, there will be 2 minutes of debate equally divided between Senator SMITH and Senator HUTCHISON, followed by a rollcall vote on or in relation to the amendment. Following that vote, it is hoped that Members with amendments to the NATO enlargement treaty will come to the floor to offer and debate those amendments.

The majority leader has indicated to me it is his hope the Senate will be able to complete action on the NATO treaty hopefully by the close of business today or by Thursday evening at the latest. So I thank my colleagues for their attention to this matter.

Mr. President, I believe under the previous order, there are 2 minutes equally divided between Senator HUTCHISON and myself.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now go into executive session and resume consideration of Executive Calendar No. 16, which the clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

Treaty Document No. 105-36, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The Senate resumed consideration of the treaty.

Pending:

Smith (New Hampshire)/Hutchison amendment No. 2314, to express a condition requiring full cooperation from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with United States efforts to obtain the fullest possible accounting of captured and missing United States personnel from past military conflicts or Cold War incidents.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2314

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of the Smith-Hutchison amendment No. 2314. There are 2 minutes of debate reserved prior to the vote.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President I yield myself 1 minute.

This is a straightforward, simple amendment which I am confident has a strong bipartisan support of this Chamber. It is based on the debate yesterday, with myself, Senator HUTCHISON and Senator BIDEN. I don't expect any opposition.

The amendment expresses a condition with full regard to NATO expansion requiring full cooperation from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland concerning unaccounted for MIAs and POWs, and it is supported by all POW and MIA families and certainly

• This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor.



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many of the national veterans organizations.

I want to stress that I personally received pledges of cooperation from the leaders of the three countries involved here. This amendment is designed to ensure that there is serious follow-up not only with the individuals who may have accessed information but also access to the archives.

I want to thank Senator HUTCHISON of Texas for her support on this humanitarian issue, and I yield to her 1 minute.

Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator SMITH for working with me on this amendment. We must never pass an opportunity to continue to give hope to those whose loved ones are missing because they served our country.

This amendment says to them we will never forget and if there is ever a shred of hope that we could learn more about how even one service man or woman died or became missing, it is worth every effort that we would make. That is what this amendment does.

I urge its passage.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I yield the remainder to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent after the vote I be recognized to speak on NATO expansion for up to 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment 2314, offered by the Senator from New Hampshire. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. BOND) is necessarily absent.

Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Illinois (Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN) and the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. ROCKEFELLER) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Illinois (Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN) would vote "aye."

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BURNS). Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced—yeas 97, nays 0, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 108 Ex.]

YEAS—97

Abraham	Cleland	Feinstein
Akaka	Coats	Ford
Allard	Cochran	Frist
Ashcroft	Collins	Glenn
Baucus	Conrad	Gorton
Bennett	Coverdell	Graham
Biden	Craig	Gramm
Bingaman	D'Amato	Grams
Boxer	Daschle	Grassley
Breaux	DeWine	Gregg
Brownback	Dodd	Hagel
Bryan	Domenici	Harkin
Bumpers	Dorgan	Hatch
Burns	Durbin	Helms
Byrd	Enzi	Hollings
Campbell	Faircloth	Hutchinson
Chafee	Feingold	Hutchison

Inhofe	Lugar	Sessions
Inouye	Mack	Shelby
Jeffords	McCain	Smith (NH)
Johnson	McConnell	Smith (OR)
Kempthorne	Mikulski	Snowe
Kennedy	Moynihan	Specter
Kerrey	Murkowski	Stevens
Kerry	Murray	Thomas
Kohl	Nickles	Thompson
Kyl	Reed	Thurmond
Landrieu	Reid	Torricelli
Lautenberg	Robb	Warner
Leahy	Roberts	Wellstone
Levin	Roth	Wyden
Lieberman	Santorum	
Lott	Sarbanes	

NOT VOTING—3

Bond Moseley-Braun Rockefeller

The executive amendment (No. 2314) was agreed to.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, Senator WELLSTONE of Minnesota is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, my colleague from Idaho approached me and said he needed to take 5 minutes for an amendment that he wants to lay down. Is that correct?

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my colleague, Senator CRAIG, be allowed up to 5 minutes to offer his amendment and speak on his amendment, after which I then would retain the floor and be able to speak for 30 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Idaho is recognized.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, let me first of all thank Senator WELLSTONE for his courtesy.

EXECUTIVE AMENDMENT NO. 2316

(Purpose: To condition United States ratification of the protocols on specific statutory authorization for the continued deployment of United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission)

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk that I call up.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Idaho (Mr. CRAIG), for himself, and Mrs. HUTCHISON, and Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, proposes an executive amendment numbered 2316.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

() STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR DEPLOYMENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law containing specific authorization for the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, again thanking my colleague, Senator WELLSTONE, for his courtesy, I will be

brief. It is a very direct and simple amendment but I think a most powerful amendment. Let me read it.

Statutory Authorization for Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.—Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, there must be enacted a law containing specific authorization for the continued deployment of the United States Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO mission in that country.

That is the substance of the amendment. This amendment would require that before the President can deposit the instruments of ratification, he must receive authorization from this Congress for the mission in Bosnia.

Last May, President Clinton publicly embraced the idea of a new NATO mission. It is my concern that the President's vision of a new NATO will signal the end of NATO as a defense alliance and the beginning of a new role as a regional peacekeeping organization. The President declared, "We are building a new NATO. We will remain the strongest alliance in history, with smaller, more flexible forces prepared for our defense but also trained for peacekeeping. It will be an alliance directed no longer against a hostile block of nations but instead designed to advance the security of every democracy in Europe—NATO's old members, now members and nonmembers alike."

I cannot support the President's call for a new NATO to be a de facto peacekeeping organization worldwide.

Mr. President, President Clinton's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia has been going on now for more than 2 years without authorization from Congress, with costs mounting far beyond any estimate, with the mission's end date repeatedly broken. The mission in Bosnia is now what we were promised it would not be, an unauthorized, open-ended, nation-building deployment with no withdrawal criteria.

As costs for NATO's mission in Bosnia continue to add up, the President seems eager to take on new peacekeeping operations. Make no mistake; the U.S. is paying the lion's share of the peacekeeping in Bosnia. We all know these costs are high for the Defense Department. The Defense Department is forced to come to Congress for supplemental funds. We are now meeting in a conference of the Appropriations Committee to deal with those very issues for the Defense Department.

In 1995, the President vowed that U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia should and will take about 1 year and cost about \$1 billion. Three years and \$8 billion later, the administration now admits we do not propose a fixed end date for the deployment.

Let me be clear. My amendment is not a war powers resolution. It does not say the President cannot continue the deployment in Bosnia without authorization, nor does it cut off funds

for Bosnia, nor does it set an end date for the mission, nor does it establish a withdrawal criteria. It does, however, require the President to cooperate with Congress to set reasonable parameters for that mission before the President gets a blank check in the form of a new NATO for more of other area missions. The commitment of U.S. troops to Bosnia is a commitment of U.S. blood, and expansion of NATO is an expansion of this commitment. The decision to place U.S. troops in harm's way is a commitment that none of us take lightly. We owe it to our troops to obtain authorization for peacekeeping missions. That is what my amendment sets forth.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 1 minute, 60 seconds?

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, I would be pleased to yield him 5 minutes.

Mr. BIDEN. There is no need for that.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I yield my colleague 1 minute after which I will retain the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho and I are going to have a chance to debate this issue later this afternoon. But I would just say to those who heard what he had to say in the introduction, consider the following: This is a treaty. This is not a conference report. This is not a piece of legislation. This is a treaty. And we should not be effectively legislating on a treaty. This treaty is going to go back to every other nation to sign, and we are going to say, by the way, there is a paragraph in here that says, "The Senate authorization committee," and they are going to think they are reading Greek. It has nothing to do with the treaty.

I do not in any way belittle his concern; it is worthy of debate, but it should not be on a treaty. I will make that point more forcefully when we get into the debate.

I thank my colleague for yielding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to NATO expansion. NATO expansion has been described by the distinguished foreign policy expert, Professor Ronald Steel, "as a bad idea whose time has come." My fervent hope is that he's only half right in that it will turn out to be "a bad idea whose time hasn't come."

Why do I oppose the expansion of NATO? Two fundamental reasons. First because I've yet to hear a plausible case made for expanding NATO, which makes me think we are talking about a policy still in search of a justification. And second, because I believe it will sour our relations with Russia, promote internal changes within Russia harmful to U.S. interests, and may even imperil our own security and that of our allies.

Since the two basic reasons for my opposition tend to be intertwined, I'll

deal with them together rather than separately.

Mr. President, I've yet to hear an explanation of why we should be expanding the NATO military alliance toward Russia's borders when there is no Russian military threat. The Russian military has collapsed. If there was any doubt about this, it should have been erased by the Russian army's inability to quell tiny, rag-tag Chechnyan forces. Even Polish sources have questioned Russia's capability to threaten its former Eastern Bloc allies in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, arms control agreements signed between 1987 and 1993, pushed through by Presidents Reagan and Bush working with President Gorbachev, have helped to establish a new security structure that makes a surprise attack in Central Europe virtually impossible. The security situation in Central Europe is more stable than it has been at any time in this century. There is peace between states in Europe for the first time in centuries.

Under these circumstances, why in heaven's name are we rushing to expand a military alliance into Central Europe?

Secretary Albright has claimed that expanding NATO will produce an "undivided" Europe. I believe the Secretary is mistaken. What it will do is re-create a dividing line in Europe, only farther east than the original Cold War dividing line. President Clinton himself, before he decided to back NATO expansion, said that it would "draw a new line through Europe, just a little farther east." He was right then and I am right now.

Mr. President, since a Europe without dividing lines is vital if the continent is to be peaceful, prosperous and secure, why are we now considering a step that is sure to re-divide Europe?

What would a re-divided Europe mean? Well, for one thing, the U.S. is committed to bringing the Baltic states into NATO if expansion proceeds. In my view this could have devastating consequences for world peace. In this connection, I recently read an outstanding piece entitled "NATO Expansion and the Baltic Iceberg" by Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of American Foreign Policy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and Director of the Project on East-West Relations of the Council on Foreign Relations. I have had the good fortune to meet with Professor Mandelbaum and I found him to be a perceptive critic of NATO expansion who views the issue through the lens of history. He succinctly describes the dilemma that would be created by the commitment to expanding NATO to the Baltic states.

Professor Mandelbaum outlines three options:

... the American government might try to expand NATO to the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European objections. ... If on the other hand Washington did

somehow prevail on the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or failing that, offered them a unilateral alliance like the Japanese-American Security Treaty, the United States would be obliged to provide for their defense. This option surely require re-creating in some form the military deployments of the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons would have to be stationed within the borders of the three countries. ... Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well turn out to be defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West Berlin was during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion would return the world to the hair trigger nuclear standoff of the 1950's and 1960's.

Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks including the Balts will entail, the likeliest option for the United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened, the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the principle that American security guarantees are available only to those who don't need them. ... It would break a promise the Balts have received from the United States. ...

The damage to American interests that each of the three options would inflict would be infinitely greater than whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the NATO expansion that is now before the Senate would cause. And rejecting the plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage. Rejection, that is, is the only way to steer the American ship of state clear of the large menacing iceberg toward which the Clinton administration is now guiding it.

I couldn't agree more.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Professor Mandelbaum's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NATO EXPANSION AND THE BALTIC ICEBERG

(By Michael Mandelbaum)

NATO expansion is the Titanic of American foreign policy, and the iceberg on which it is doomed to founder is Baltic membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

The problem of NATO membership for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is one that, if the proposal to admit Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is ratified by the Senate, the United States will be able neither to avoid nor to solve. The only way to steer clear of this geopolitical iceberg is to reject the plan for expansion that the Clinton administration has placed before the Senate.

If expansion proceeds, the United States is committed to bringing the Balts into the Alliance. That commitment has been expressed in many places and in many forms: at the Madrid Summit last summer at which formal invitations to join NATO were issued to the three Central European countries; in the Baltic-American Charter signed by President Clinton in January; in the resolution of ratification the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported; in numerous statements by American officials, such as Madeleine Albright's assertion that no European democracy will be denied admission to NATO "because of where it sits on the map"; and by assurances given to officials of the Baltic

countries and representatives of Baltic-American groups.

Moreover, if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are, as the Clinton administration says, "entitled" to NATO membership, then so, too, are the Balts. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are just as democratic, just as pro-Western, just as much in need of the stability that NATO membership allegedly confers, and suffered just as much under Communism as the three Central European countries whose candidacies the administration has chosen to favor. Thus, even if there were no commitment to the Balts, logic and justice would prohibit excluding them while including the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs. But there is a commitment, which ratifying membership for the Central European countries would trigger.

All politically relevant Russians, however, including Boris Yeltsin, have said, repeatedly and emphatically, that Baltic membership in NATO, which would bring the Western military alliance, from which they are excluded, to their borders, is entirely unacceptable to them. The Russians have said that Baltic membership would cast into doubt all existing agreements between Russia and the West, including the historic treaties reducing nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. They have made it clear that they would regard Baltic membership NATO as a provocation, to which they would respond.

The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the Atlantic Alliance would therefore confront the United States with three—and only three—options, all of them bad.

First, the American government might try to expand NATO to the Baltic countries but fail because of Western European objections. Such objections are all but certain on the part of countries that have already made it clear that they are going along with the first round of expansion largely to humor the Americans and that they will contribute nothing to its costs. Because of Russian opposition, Western Europeans are privately negative, sometimes adamantly so, about Baltic membership. If the United States pressed the issue, as it would be bound to do given the commitment the Clinton administration has made, the result would be a serious crisis at the core of the Alliance, with charges of bad faith and recklessness echoing back and forth across the Atlantic, that could end by destroying NATO itself.

If, on the other hand, Washington did somehow prevail on the Western Europeans to admit the Balts, or, failing that, offered them a unilateral alliance like the Japanese-American Security Treaty, the United States would be obliged to provide for their defense. This second option would surely require recreating in some form the military deployments of the Cold War. American troops and American nuclear weapons would have to be stationed within the borders of the three countries. This would not be cheap, which is one reason, although hardly the only one, that the Clinton administration's estimate of the price of expansion, which does not include cost of fulfilling the American commitment to the Balts, is ludicrously low.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia might well turn out to be defensible only with nuclear weapons, as West Berlin was during the Cold War, in which case NATO expansion would return the world to the hair-trigger nuclear standoff of the 1950s and 1960s. That is why Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's warning that NATO expansion could, unintentionally, "raise the prospect of nuclear war to the most intense point it has reached since the beginning of the Nuclear Age" is not hyperbole. It is, rather, a reasonable assessment of the consequences of policies to which, if Po-

land, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join NATO, the United States and Russia are already committed.

Because of the determined opposition to Baltic membership the Western Europeans will mount, and the huge risks that including the Balts would entail, the likeliest option for the United States is the third: Having agreed to defend three countries in Central Europe that are not remotely threatened, the United States will renege on its commitment to defend the Balts precisely because they might be threatened. This option would enshrine in the foreign policy of the United States the principle that American security guarantees are available only to those who do not need them. It would also accomplish exactly what its champions claim NATO expansion is designed to avoid: It would draw a new line of division in Europe and consign friendly democracies to the wrong side of it. It would break a promise the Balts have received from the United States. It would give the Russians what the Clinton administration has sworn it will never permit: a veto on the question of which countries belong to NATO.

Moreover, it would fortify the Communists and nationalists in Russia, who would be able to say to their pro-Western, democratic political opponents: "We tried your preferred policy, cooperation with the West, and what was the result? NATO expanded to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic without consulting us, against our wishes, and in flagrant violation of the promise not to do so given to Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze at the time of German unification in 1990. Then Russia adopted our tactics: standing firm, drawing a line, and making threats. And what is the result? NATO expansion has stopped in its tracks. Our way of dealing with the West has been vindicated." This is hardly a lesson that it is in the interest of the United States to teach Russia. The fact that it is the lesson that Russia is all too likely to learn is one reason that, according to Alexei Arbatov, a member of the unimpeachably democratic Yabloko faction in the Russian State Duma and the leader in the effort to persuade the Duma to ratify the START II arms reduction treaty, Russians—who have advocated cooperation with the West—feel betrayed by NATO expansion.

Since no American president will ever be able to say, definitely and absolutely, that the Baltic countries will never join NATO, however, even this third option will not put an end to the matter. Russians will always have to believe that NATO might expand to the Baltic countries, and this prospect will therefore poison Russian-American relations far into the future.

The damage to American interests that each of the three options would inflict would be infinitely greater than whatever modest embarrassment rejecting the plan for NATO expansion that is now before the Senate would cause. And rejecting the plan is the only sure way to avoid the damage. Rejection, that is, is the only way to steer the American ship of state clear of the large, menacing iceberg toward which the Clinton administration is now guiding it.

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the administration often claims its aim in expanding NATO is to foster democracy, stability, and economic reform in Central Europe. But there already is democracy, stability and economic reform in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Besides, if this was our aim wouldn't the European Union, whose fundamental purpose is to spur growth and stability through integration, be a better vehicle for accom-

plishing these goals than NATO, which is after all a military alliance? If our goal is to expand markets and democracy, why don't we use our leverage to promote the expansion of the European Union?

Central European states covet membership in the European Union for the economic benefits they believe it would confer. Wouldn't it be better for the United States to exert our leadership, our great influence, to promote expansion of the European Union which threatens no one rather than expand a military alliance that threatens the one country on which European security depends most?

What worries me most though, Mr. President, is that NATO expansion, needlessly risks poisoning Russia's relations with the U.S. for years to come and increases the odds that Russian ultra-nationalists and anti-U.S. forces will gain power in the post-Yeltsin Period. NATO expansion threatens to turn the clock back to the worst days of the Cold War, something that few Americans and few Europeans want.

Former Russian officials say and some former American officials confirm that by seeking to expand NATO, the U.S. is violating a commitment made when Moscow agreed to Germany's reunification and remaining in NATO, withdrawing Russian troops from Germany, and disbanding the Warsaw Pact. While there is some disagreement over what commitment was actually made to Gorbachev, there is no question that Russian officials say they had firm U.S. assurances that NATO would not be expanded. The Russian perception that we are reneging on our word can only erode trust and poison future relations.

On this point, I will quote Susan Eisenhower, Chairman, The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 19, 1998:

It is Russian democrats who feel betrayed by NATO expansion—not the hard liners who are benefitting from it. Gorbachev says that we were verbally assured that NATO would not expand if the Soviet Union agreed to German unification and its place in NATO. Under the war-time Four Powers Act, Moscow had a legal right to refuse such an arrangement, and would have if the Soviets had imagined that less than a decade later some and eventually all of their former allies would be gazing at them from the other side of a military alliance. Russian hard liners, always deeply skeptical of Western intentions, say this "betrayal" is par for the course, and they mock the Russian democrats for trusting the West too much.

Eisenhower, who met Gorbachev on a recent trip to Moscow, reported that Gorbachev was deeply disturbed by NATO Expansion's impact on those who promoted cooperation with the West, adding:

"Russia has been swindled," he asserted, and it is feeding into the wild ideas of those who hold "conspiracy theories" that the West is intent not only on the Soviet Union's demise but also Russia's. "NATO expansion has poisoned the atmosphere of trust," he said.

Mr. President, it is worth pointing out that the sense of betrayal isn't confined to former President Gorbachev, but is shared by our natural allies in today's Russia, political leaders who are committed both to democracy and U.S.-Russia cooperation. For example, there is Dr. Alexei Arbatov, deputy chairman of the Defense Committee of the Duma. Dr. Arbatov is a member of the leadership of Yabloko, Russia's largest unimpeachably democratic party, a strong advocate of U.S.-Russia cooperation, and a leader in the effort to ratify the START-II Treaty in the Duma. He was involved in the START-I negotiations in Geneva, and later served as a consultant on all the major Soviet-American and Russian-American arms control issues, including the START-II and CFE treaties.

Here are Dr. Arbatov's thoughts on NATO expansion in light of Russia's agreement to German reunification and other concessions:

... Nobody took the trouble to warn Russian that as a result of all these concessions and sacrifices, NATO—the most powerful military alliance in the world—would start moving towards Russian borders. To the contrary, Moscow was repeatedly told by the West that it would be accepted as an equal and genuine partner and that no major decision on international security would be made without it. Well the NATO summit in Madrid came as a clear manifestation that such decisions may and will be made and Russia's opinion really matters only so long as it is in line with the Western position. . . . At best, NATO expansion to the East is regarded in Russia as a mistaken policy. . . . At worst it is regarded as the consummation of a 'grand design' to encircle and isolate Russia, establishing strategic superiority and finally destroying Russia, ending once and for all Russia's role as a European power.

If this is how a democrat and advocate of U.S.-Russian amity sees it, imagine how more conservative, more nationalist forces who could come to power in the future see it.

Mr. President, am I missing something? Is there some compelling, overriding reason that makes NATO expansion so vital to U.S. interests that we must imperil our relations with Russia for years to come and revive Russian mistrust and paranoia? If this is so, I would appreciate it if one of my colleagues or the Administration could tell me, and more important the American people, what that compelling, over-riding reason is.

There is no question in my mind that colleagues who support NATO expansion do so because they believe it would be in the interests of the United States and think it would be the right thing to do. I question no colleague on that. But I am troubled by the fact that U.S. arms makers have played a major role in lobbying for NATO expansion. And this lobbying has been confined just to the United States. As difficult as it may be to believe, McDonnell Douglas helped the Hungarian Government win public support in a referendum on joining NATO by financing a CD-ROM game called "Natopoly" that was distributed free

to libraries throughout Hungary. The Washington Post described it as a "piece of slick, unabashedly pro-NATO software."

Mr. President, U.S. arms makers seem to equate expanding NATO with expanding profits. To explain what I mean, let me quote from a June 29, 1997 New York Times article entitled, "Arms Makers See Bonanza in Selling NATO Expansion":

At night, Bruce L. Jackson is president of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, giving intimate dinners for Senators and foreign officials. By day, he is director of strategic planning for Lockheed Martin Corporation.

Mr. Jackson says he keeps his two identities separate, but his company and his lobbying group are fighting the same battle. Defense contractors are acting like globe-hopping diplomats to encourage the expansion of NATO, which will create a huge market for their wares.

... "The stakes are high" for arms makers, said Joel L. Johnson, vice president for international affairs at the Aerospace Industries Association. . . . "Whoever gets in first will have a lock for the next quarter century." The potential market for jets alone is \$10 billion, he said. . . . "Then there's transport aircraft, utility helicopters, attack helicopters," Mr. Johnson said—not to mention military communications systems, computers, radar, radios, and other tools of a modern fighting force. "Add these together, and we're talking real money," he said.

And the real "real money" he's talking about is more likely to come from the U.S. taxpayers than from new NATO members. In fact, it appears as if funds are already coming from the U.S. taxpayer to subsidize arms purchases by potential NATO members.

Let me also draw from a study by William D. Hartung, the author of the report which is entitled *Welfare for Weapons Dealers 1998: The Hidden Costs of NATO Expansion*.

I will read the summary of his key findings. Mr. President, how much time do I have left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 13 minutes 36 seconds.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

Mr. Hartung wrote:

Potential new members of NATO are the largest recipients of subsidized military loans from the U.S. Government: Allocations for potential NATO members now dominate the Pentagon's FMF loan program, representing 44.8 percent of the \$540.1 million in FMF loans for fiscal year 1997 and 61.2 percent of the \$647.5 million for fiscal year 1998.

NATO expansion is good news for Boeing and Lockheed Martin, but is a potential disaster for U.S. taxpayers: Lockheed Martin has been promising "100 percent economic cooperation and up to 100 percent financing" for countries that buy F-16 fighters. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Textron all have deals in the works to produce U.S.-designed weapons in East and Central Europe as an inducement to get officials there to "buy American". . . . The questionable terms on U.S. military loans to the region could leave U.S. taxpayers to pick up the tab for hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars in potential defaults. The likely result of all this furious marketing activity would be a U.S.-subsidized re-arming of East and Central Europe that will fatten the bottom line of U.S. weapon makers at the expense of U.S. taxpayers.

Mr. President, if Mr. Hartung is right, and I think there is a good chance he is, NATO expansion will be a double whammy for U.S. taxpayers. They will wind up subsidizing U.S. arms merchants in a venture that will bring them less, not more, security.

I now want to mention Senator Nunn, who I join in opposing NATO expansion. He deserves a great deal of credit for being the first Senator, to my knowledge, to raise fundamental questions about the wisdom of NATO expansion. Because of my enormous respect for Senator Nunn's knowledge of national security and defense issues, his concerns about NATO expansion influenced my own thinking.

Senator Nunn delivered one of the most incisive statements I have ever heard on the issue when he appeared on the Jim Lehrer Newshour show in March of 1997. He addressed both the possible impact of NATO expansion on our national security and on Russia domestically.

Here is what Senator Sam Nunn had to say:

I'll start with the question, what are the greatest threats to the United States? Clearly, the No. 1 threat to the United States today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether chemical or biological or nuclear.

I agree with Senator Nunn, that should be the foundation of our foreign policy, our No. 1 concern.

Then my question would be: Does NATO expansion help in the fight against proliferation of these weapons going to the third world rogue countries or terrorist groups? And my answer to that is no, it makes the cooperation that we have underway with Russia more difficult, perhaps not impossible, but more difficult.

The second question I ask is about nuclear threats. Does NATO expansion help us in terms of easing the nuclear trigger, while Russia still has thousands and thousands of nuclear weapons, or is it harmful? And I think the answer to that is it makes it more difficult because it puts enormous pressure on the Russian military. They're extremely weak, conventionally now. They're not a threat to countries we're taking in, but their reaction is likely to be a reliance, a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. So the answer that I have to both of those key questions relating to the threat is that it makes it—NATO expansion makes our security problems more difficult.

The third question is the question of Russia itself. The greatest change we've had in the threat to the United States has been the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and movement towards democracy and market reform in Russia. That has a long way to go. But the question I ask, is NATO expansion going to make reform more likely in Russia or less likely? I think it makes it more difficult because it puts pressure on our friends, the democrats in Russia, and it gives a great political issue to the demagogues there and the people on the extreme left and the extreme right.

I think my colleague, Senator Nunn, is absolutely right. It works at cross-purposes to stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I think it makes the nuclear threat more real, as Senator Nunn suggested, and it absolutely plays into the hands of the

worst forces in Russia and to the disadvantage of democrats in Russia.

Mr. President, the push for a larger NATO has already hurt our relations with Russia, as shown by the stalling of the START II agreements in the Duma, troubling frictions with Russia recently on issues ranging from U.S. policy toward Iraq, to proliferation issues, to the management of Russia's nuclear material.

My colleague, Senator MOYNIHAN, has had a distinguished career in diplomacy and international relations, and he was recently quoted as warning that extending the NATO alliance toward the frontier of Russia risks "the catastrophe of nuclear war." I cannot honestly say whether I think his analysis is right or wrong, but I have to ask myself is there any compelling reason for the U.S. rush to expand NATO if there is the slightest chance that it could trigger a nuclear war down the road. Why are we taking such a chance?

Dr. Arbatov, while in Washington last month to attend meetings at the Center for Political and Strategic Studies, took issue with those in the West who contend that Russians don't really care about NATO expansion. The following is a summary from his remarks that Arbatov approved:

Contrary to what is being said by many Western proponents of NATO, Russians do care about NATO expansion, and they are almost unanimously opposed. It is true that most Russians, like most Americans, are primarily concerned about everyday things and making ends meet. But almost everyone who has any interest in foreign affairs is very concerned. Millions of pensioners who remember World War II, all the military, workers in defense industries, intellectuals, government and political elites care very deeply about this issue. And nearly the full spectrum of Russian politicians is opposed to the expansion of NATO.

I want to conclude this way. Susan Eisenhower points out that not only are Russia's progressive forces being put under enormous pressure by NATO expansion, but there are signs Russian conservatives are already using it to their own advantage. Eisenhower stresses:

There is already tangible evidence that NATO expansion has given conservative forces—

Which has a different meaning, I say to my conservative colleagues here, than conservatism in America.

a platform. On January 23, the Duma overwhelmingly passed a resolution stating that NATO expansion is the "most serious military threat to our country since 1945." It also said that Baltic membership in NATO would be incompatible with the NATO-Russian Founding Act . . . The resolution requested that the Yeltsin government devise a program to counteract NATO expansion.

In pursuing NATO expansion, why is the administration disregarding the warnings of Russian democrats, George Kennan and other distinguished Russian scholars, that NATO expansion is likely to sow the seeds for the reemergence of antidemocratic and chauvinist trends in Russia? That is a serious threat, I say to my colleagues, to our

lives, our children's lives, and our grandchildren's lives.

I am especially puzzled by this since it must be evident to both supporters and foes of NATO expansion that European security and stability is greatly dependent on Russia's transition to democracy. A democratic Russia is unlikely to ever threaten its neighbors.

Why then are we considering a step that will weaken Russia's democrats and strengthen ultra-nationalists who oppose democracy? George Kennan has said—George Kennan who wrote the famous Mr. X article in *Foreign Affairs*; George Kennan, perhaps the most prominent thinker about Russia in our country—George Kennan with the most distinguished career possible has said that expanding NATO "may be expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy. * * *

Let me repeat that quote. George Kennan has said that expanding NATO "may be expected to inflame nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion [and] to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy * * *

I urge my colleagues to carefully consider George Kennan's wise words, the heartfelt words of Russian democrats, and the prophetic words of Senator Sam Nunn and join me in opposing ratification of NATO expansion.

Mr. President, I ask how much time I have left.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes left.

Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.

THE MURDER OF BISHOP JUAN GERARDI CONEDERA

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, in the 2 minutes I have remaining, I just want to bring to the attention of my colleagues that wonderful bishop in Guatemala, Juan Gerardi—a man of justice—who was assassinated on Sunday. He was the director and founder of the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala. It has been absolutely devastating to the forces for democracy in Guatemala and to the forces for human rights.

On the floor of the Senate today, I just want to say that I believe, as a Senator, that our Government should make it crystal clear to the Government in Guatemala that we want a full accounting. I urge the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala to ask the Guatemalan government to swiftly investigate this crime; it is a terrible setback to the effort to shine a light into the dark corners of our hemisphere's history.

What we know so far is that on Sunday, April 26, Bishop Gerardi was assaulted and killed as he entered his home. His attacker, whose identity is unknown, smashed the Bishop's head with such brutality that his features were obliterated and his body could

only be identified by his ring. Nothing was stolen from Bishop Gerardi's body or his house, nor was his car stolen.

When you have a courageous Catholic bishop who has been such a strong advocate for human rights murdered, we need to know—the people in Guatemala need to know—what happened. There needs to be accountability.

Mr. President, this vicious crime is all the more terrible because of the context in which it occurred. On Friday, Bishop Gerardi had released the Archdiocese's report on past human rights violations in Guatemala entitled "Guatemala: Never Again." He directed the Catholic Church's effort to gather information on the long, tragic history of massacres, killings, and torture in that country. These efforts are an important part of the people of Guatemala's efforts to come to terms with their past, through a full and accurate accounting of past human rights abuses.

I do not prejudice this. I do not know who committed this brutal assassination. But like the Catholic Church in our country and like people all across the world who care so much about democracy and human rights, as a Senator, I do call on the Government of Guatemala to launch an immediate investigation into the murder of Bishop Gerardi, and to make sure that they bring this to closure and we find out who was responsible for this barbaric act. Whether or not this was a crime against a man who was merely in the wrong place at the wrong time or a carefully calculated attack against the Bishop and his work, the truth must be brought to light. Adding another mystery to the labyrinth of deaths, disappearances, and shattered lives in Guatemala would compound the tragedy of the loss of one of Latin America's great human rights leaders.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the statement from the Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala, as well as a copy of my letter to the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala, be printed in the RECORD.

I thank my colleagues for their courtesy. I yield the floor.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OFFICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ARCHBISHOP OF GUATEMALA.

In the Face of the Abominable Assassination of Monseñor Juan José Gerardi Conedera, The Human Rights Office of the Archbishop of Guatemala Announces:

1. Its profound pain and indignation for the cowardly and brutal assassination of Monseñor Gerardi, the founder and General Coordinator of this office.

2. On Sunday, April 26 at around 10:00 pm, when he was entering his house after doing a routine family visit, Monseñor Gerardi was attacked by an individual who was not identified. The assassin first hit Mons. Gerardi on the back of the head with a piece of cement, and later delivered blows to the bishop's face, disfiguring it. The individual returned to a site near the crime ten minutes later, having changed his clothes since they had been soaked with the bishop's